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Compared to other animals, humans appear to have a special motivation to share experiences 16 
and mental states with others (Clark, 2006; Grice, 1975), which enables them to enter a 17 
condition of  ‘we’ or shared intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005). Shared 18 
intentionality has been suggested to be an evolutionary response to unique problems faced in 19 
complex joint action coordination (Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & 20 
Moll, 2005) and to be unique to humans (Tomasello, 2014). The theoretical and empirical 21 
bases for this claim, however, present several issues and inconsistencies. Here, we suggest 22 
that shared intentionality can be approached as an interactional achievement, and that by 23 
studying how our closest relatives, the great apes, coordinate joint action with conspecifics, 24 
we might demonstrate some correlate abilities of shared intentionality, such as the 25 
appreciation of joint commitment. We provide seven examples from bonobo joint activities to 26 
illustrate our framework. 27 
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1. Introduction 68 
Most social animal species cooperate in response to a range of problems and often in complex 69 
ways (Clutton-Brock, 2009; Trivers, 1971), but human cooperation is usually singled out as 70 
unique, for a variety of reasons. Prominent among these are accounts based on the human 71 
motivations and abilities for interacting cooperatively (Levinson, 2006), which have led to the 72 
possibility of complex joint action and the emergence of cumulative culture, social 73 
institutions, norms and conventionalised languages (Tomasello, 2009). When humans 74 
perform joint actions they do so by collaborating towards a shared goal, which requires 75 
coordination of individual actions (H. H. Clark, 1996), attentional foci, visual perspectives 76 
and intentional states (Moll & Tomasello, 2007). Human joint action has thus been 77 
characterized as establishing a state of  ‘we’ intentionality, also called collective intentionality 78 
(Searle, 1990) or shared intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007). Although intuitively 79 
appealing, the concept is controversial. While many agree that there is something special 80 
about how humans interact, and that their joint actions are enabled by shared intentionality, it 81 
has been difficult to agree on the cognitive abilities and mental states constituting it.  One 82 
contentious issue is whether shared intentionality is a qualitatively distinct cognitive ability, 83 
and based on a special motivation to share experiences and mental states with others, and is 84 
thus unique to adult humans, or whether it emerges gradually (ontogenetically and 85 
phylogenetically) from simpler forms of social awareness. 86 
In this paper, we describe an alternative approach to the comparative assessment of 87 
shared intentionality that is less reliant on assumptions about cognitive states and abilities. 88 
We propose a framework for describing the collaborative process necessary to achieve 89 
coordinated joint action that can be applied to any species. Our core thesis is that shared 90 
intentionality can be operationalised as a publicly observable interactional achievement, i.e., 91 
as the outcome of a joint process of alignment of behaviours via signal exchange (Mondada, 92 
2011; Schegloff, 1986) during joint action, irrespective of cognitive states presumed to be 93 
involved in cooperative activities. This framework will allow systematic assessment of the 94 
presence or absence of specific behavioural correlates of shared intentionality, such as 95 
attempts to establish participation frameworks when initiating a joint action, reengaging 96 
partners who interrupt the joint action, or showing signs of leave-taking when disengaging 97 
from the joint action. Our approach is based on an understanding, derived from 98 
interdisciplinary studies of human social interactions, of how humans get into, conduct, and 99 
get out of joint actions in an orderly way, thereby collaboratively constructing the state of 100 
“togetherness” characteristic of shared intentionality. This creates a broader, less theory-laden 101 
set of criteria for assessing shared intentionality than previously considered.  102 
We first review the mainstream view, which portrays shared intentionality as a high-103 
level individual cognitive ability, and the critiques of this view that have emerged. We then 104 
describe our framework, inspired by both ethology and human interaction research. We 105 
illustrate it with examples of how bonobos, the closest primate relative of modern humans, 106 
coordinate naturally occurring joint actions. The examples suggest that bonobos are sensitive 107 
to some degree to the imperatives involved in opening, maintaining, and closing joint actions. 108 
We finish by assessing the implications of our framework in offering new perspectives on the 109 
evolutionary origins of shared intentionality and its links to uniquely human traits, such as 110 
language. 111 
2. Shared intentionality  112 
2.1 Defining shared intentionality: Ability vs. process-based approaches 113 
Definitions of shared intentionality focus on the ability and motivation (Levinson, 2006; 114 
Rosas & Bermúdez, 2018) to participate in joint commitments or to share goals or intentions. 115 
For Searle (1990), collective intentions are not simply the sum of individual intentions of 116 
doing things jointly with someone else, nor the sum of individual capacities for planning and 117 
coordinating actions with others. Coinciding individual intentions, in other words, are not 118 
sufficient to create shared intentions (Bratman, 1993; Tomasello, 2014; Tuomela, 2005). For 119 
instance, to play a game of tennis together, it is not sufficient that two players intend to play a 120 
game of tennis, but both also have to agree to play the game together. Purportedly, shared 121 
intentionality thus relies on complex cognitive abilities, such as recursive mind-reading and 122 
perspective-taking, allowing partners to understand that their roles are complementary and 123 
part of a joint commitment (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007; Tomasello & Moll, 2010).  124 
However, these definitions tend to place the bar for what counts as shared intentionality rather 125 
high (Tollefsen & Dale, 2012), thus excluding cases of joint action in agents with different 126 
cognitive abilities than adult humans, e.g., children, animals or artificial agents (Kern & Moll, 127 
2017; Rosas & Bermúdez, 2018; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2016; Townsend et al., 2017). 128 
Moreover, shared intentionality, in this view, is conceptualized as a modular evolutionary 129 
saltation rather than as a set of gradually evolved cognitive capacities, which is problematic. 130 
A potentially promising solution to this problem has been proposed by Tollefsen and Dale 131 
(2012), who suggest focusing on the processes by which joint action is initiated and 132 
maintained. While high-level joint commitments can entail the initiation of joint actions (e.g., 133 
two players agree to play tennis together), their maintenance may often rely on lower-level 134 
alignment processes (e.g., hitting the ball back and forth) that involve perception or motor 135 
behaviour and, presumably, little cognition.   136 
A focus on the processes of joint actions has the additional advantage of opening 137 
research on the phylogenetic history of shared intentionality. This is well illustrated by a 138 
recent study on object moving in Paratrechina longicornis ants. When humans perform the 139 
joint action of moving a piano into a house, they typically coordinate their individual actions 140 
with communication, to coordinate movements, assign roles and agree on leadership, that is, 141 
they enter a state of shared intention. When the ants were tested with a very similar problem 142 
(carrying large food items to the nest) they also coordinated their actions and avoided 143 
inefficient tug-of-wars, but their joint action was not driven by communication, role taking, or 144 
agreed leadership but from an over-proportional influence of newly arriving ants that were 145 
best informed about the nest-bound direction (Gelblum et al., 2015). Hence, although ants can 146 
coordinate their actions to collaboratively carry large loads, the processes through which joint 147 
action are achieved (and degree to which participants understand these processes) are 148 
different from humans. We thus suggest that studying the alignment processes involved in the 149 
coordination of joint action has explanatory potential for reconstructing the evolution of 150 
shared intentionality. 151 
2.2. Shared intentionality in great apes? 152 
Although apes cooperate regularly, e.g., hunting (C. Boesch, 2002, 2005) or patrolling 153 
borders (Watts & Mitani, 2001), it is unclear whether they experience something akin to 154 
shared intentionality (C. Boesch & Boesch, 1989; Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg, & 155 
Tomasello, 2011; Mitani & Watts, 2001). Individuals may simply be acting in parallel with 156 
others in pursuit of a personal goal, without experiencing a state of shared intention. 157 
According to one influential account, shared intentionality involves three essential component 158 
abilities, i.e., (1) understanding of intentions, (2) cooperative communication, and (3) mutual 159 
helping (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello & Moll, 2010). 160 
Although it is very difficult to provide systematic evidence from free-ranging animals, these 161 
abilities have been demonstrated to some degree in apes, mostly in laboratory experiments. 162 
First, apes appear to understand others as intentional agents insofar as they (a) prefer partners 163 
that have collaborated well with them in the past (Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006a), (b) are 164 
capable of attributing motives to others (Call & Tomasello, 2008) and (c) appear to read false 165 
beliefs in others (Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call, & Tomasello, 2016). Second, in terms of 166 
cooperative communication, they can tailor signals to their audience’s attentional state 167 
(Hostetter, Russell, Freeman, & Hopkins, 2007; Leavens, Hostetter, Wesley, & Hopkins, 168 
2004), to their recipients’ understanding (Cartmill & Byrne, 2007), knowledge (Catherine 169 
Crockford, Wittig, Mundry, & Zuberbühler, 2012; Roberts, Vick, Roberts, & Menzel, 2014, 170 
Bohn et al. 2015) and familiarity (Genty et al., 2015a). They are capable of using referential 171 
signals (e.g., Genty & Zuberbühler, 2014; Hobaiter et al., 2014; Leavens & Hopkins, 1998; 172 
Leavens, Hopkins, et al., 2004; Lyn et al., 2014; Pika & Mitani, 2006; Savage-Rumbaugh, 173 
McDonald, Sevcik, Hopkins, & Rubert, 1986; Slocombe & Zuberbühler, 2005) and of 174 
engaging in gestural turn-taking (Fröhlich, Kuchenbuch, et al., 2016a; Rossano, 2013). Third, 175 
chimpanzees understand role reversal (Povinelli, Nelson, & Boysen, 1992) and collaborate 176 
via complementary roles (Fletcher, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2012). They reliably help 177 
conspecifics to access food (Melis & Tomasello, 2013; Melis et al., 2011; Warneken, Hare, 178 
Melis, Hanus, & Tomasello, 2007; Yamamoto, Humle, & Tanaka, 2009), even without being 179 
specifically solicited (Greenberg, Hamann, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2010). Bonobos even 180 
extend this behaviour to strangers (Tan, Ariely, & Hare, 2017).  181 
Curiously, however, despite the apparent presence of the three key component 182 
abilities for shared intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007), joint actions in great apes 183 
do not appear to be governed by it. When tested in collaborative tasks, chimpanzees do not 184 
reverse roles (Fletcher et al., 2012; Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005) nor do they help partners 185 
receive rewards after they have received their own (Greenberg et al., 2010; Hamann, 186 
Warneken, & Tomasello, 2012). Furthermore, chimpanzees do not reengage reluctant 187 
(human) partners in cooperative games, suggesting that they do not understand joint 188 
commitment (Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006). They also show no sign of leave-taking 189 
when disengaging from a joint action, and they do not protest when a partner interrupts a joint 190 
action (Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006b; Warneken et al., 2006). Taken together, these 191 
findings suggest that great ape social interactions are driven by individual and competitive 192 
motives, rather than human-like cooperation (Hare & Tomasello, 2004; Muller & Mitani, 193 
2005). Their interactions seem mostly egoistic, which is well illustrated when dominant 194 
individuals coerce others into cooperating or use them as social tools (Völter, Rossano, & 195 
Call, 2015). Also important, in captivity great apes seem to show little to no motivation for 196 
collaborating with conspecifics (Bullinger, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011; Melis & Tomasello, 197 
2013) and do not seem to understand that their actions are essential for successful joint action 198 
(Carpenter & Call, 2013). 199 
So, what could possibly account for the discrepancy between the presence of 200 
component abilities of shared intentionality and the absence of the behavioural patterns 201 
indicative of shared intentionality in apes? One possibility is that captive apes are cognitively 202 
different from wild apes (e.g. Boesch 2008), a general issue that cannot be addressed here. 203 
Another possibility is that the experimental designs used to test shared intentionality are 204 
inadequate, perhaps due to their high complexity and low ecological validity. For example, in 205 
other studies apes did cooperate in triadic activities with human partners (Hirata, Morimura, 206 
& Fuwa, 2010; MacLean & Hare, 2013; Pika & Zuberbühler, 2008), suggesting that 207 
performance differences may be due to the nature of the task. Also, in laboratory experiments 208 
apes are typically required to interact with human experimenters, with whom they do not 209 
share a natural communication system nor a relevant history of reciprocity, which could 210 
explain the performance differences between apes and human children (e.g., Warneken et al., 211 
2006). Furthermore, language-trained apes do have the potential to interact with humans in 212 
collaborative activities, to understand their communicative conventions and to communicate 213 
cooperatively with them (e.g., Gardner & Gardner, 1969; Miles, 1990; Savage-Rumbaugh et 214 
al., 1986). Finally, the current evidence largely consists of studies with chimpanzees, but 215 
there may be species differences. For instance, chimpanzees live in social organisations that 216 
are more competitive than bonobos (De Waal, 1989; Hare & Tomasello, 2004; Hare, Melis, 217 
Woods, Hastings, & Wrangham, 2007), and bonobos are more prosocial, more tolerant, and 218 
show more positive responses towards strangers (Tan et al., 2017; Tan & Hare, 2017). In sum, 219 
the current evidence for shared intentionality in great apes is controversial, with a species bias 220 
towards chimpanzees and an experimental design bias where important confounds have not 221 
been removed (Leavens, Bard, & Hopkins, 2017). 222 
2.3. Shared intentionality as a collaborative process 223 
As mentioned, definitions of shared intentionality tend to focus on a high-level cognitive 224 
ability that can be present or absent in individuals. In contrast, Tollefsen and Dale (2012) 225 
focus on the processes by which joint activities are initiated and coordinated, like behavioural 226 
and motor synchronization, is empirically better suited for systematic studies of natural social 227 
interactions. In humans, a large body of research suggests that alignment towards joint action 228 
takes place through collaborative signal exchanges that unfold via turn-taking (H. H. Clark, 229 
1996; Pickering & Garrod, 2004). These exchanges are visible and audible to external 230 
observers and thus have the potential to become public correlates of shared intentionality (or, 231 
for that matter, any kind of purportedly purely cognitive phenomena; Mondada, 2011).  232 
In fact, the concept of shared intentionality actually builds on seminal contributions to 233 
the understanding of social interaction. For example, Goffman (1963) distinguished 234 
‘unfocused’ interactions (people are co-present but do not engage in a joint activity, e.g., 235 
while waiting at a bus stop) from ‘focused’ interactions, where ratified participants sustain a 236 
shared focus of attention (see also Gilbert, 1990). In focused interactions, participants are 237 
jointly committed to an activity and thus mutually accountable towards their partners for its 238 
pursuance and completion (A. Clark, 2008; Goffman, 1963, 1967). This accountability is 239 
particularly visible when the interaction is initiated, suspended or ended. For example, 240 
partners orient their bodies, talk and gaze to progressively achieve the state of focused 241 
interaction (Mondada, 2009). They justify the necessity to suspend the interaction (Chevalley 242 
& Bangerter, 2010), try to reengage reluctant partners who may abruptly stop participating 243 
(Warneken et al., 2006) and collaborate to end the activity appropriately and take leave of 244 
each other (Albert & Kessler, 1976; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). Appropriate construction of 245 
the beginning or ending of a joint action often serves to relate it to an overarching and 246 
sustainable relation between the participants; thus, shared intentionality can endure beyond a 247 
single interaction to enable the pursuit and completion of long-term projects. 248 
We thus believe it is useful to revisit the concept of shared intentionality with a 249 
systematic redefinition as the outcome of a collaborative process of alignment via signal 250 
exchange. This is likely to open up new ways for the comparative assessment of its full or 251 
partial presence in different species. We thus advocate a close analysis of natural behaviour 252 
using state-of-the art theoretical concepts and micro-analytical methods from human 253 
interaction studies to directly compare the processes by which humans and great apes achieve 254 
coordinated joint actions, a paradigm shift that is likely to benefit animal behaviour research  255 
(Fedurek, Slocombe, Hartel, & Zuberbühler, 2015; Fröhlich et al. 2016a; Fröhlich, Müller, 256 
Zeiträg, Wittig, & Pika, 2017; Logue & Stivers, 2012; Rossano, 2013). 257 
In the next section, we describe a framework for the systematic assessment of how 258 
joint action is initiated, maintained and terminated in humans, as well as its possible 259 
application to great apes. 260 
3. Joint action coordination in humans and its application to great apes 261 
Joint action involves two or more individuals collaborating to achieve a shared goal. This 262 
poses coordination problems that need to be solved for the action to emerge and get 263 
completed successfully. Initiators of the joint action need to make their intentions intelligible 264 
to their partners. Participants need to understand what they are going to do together, when and 265 
how they are going to do it, and who is going to be involved (or not involved). Because joint 266 
actions involve spending time, effort and attention, they entail opportunity costs. In 267 
committing themselves to a joint action, then, participants renounce the opportunity to pursue 268 
other activities. Recruiting participants for joint action thus also poses potential threats to 269 
partners’ face (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Goffman, 1967), which participants need to 270 
continuously manage.  271 
As a result of these coordination demands, joint actions typically play out in three 272 
main phases. First, there is the opening phase where a participation framework is established. 273 
Participation frameworks are typically established by looking at potential partners as a way of 274 
selecting participants, by engaging in mutual gaze and gaze exchanges (Goodwin & Goodwin 275 
2004; Goodwin 2007, Rossano, 2013) to construct a shared focus of attention (Goffman, 276 
1981; Kendon, 1976, 2004). They also feature greeting sequences (De Stefani & Mondada, 277 
2018; Youssouf, Grimshaw, & Bird, 1976), and negotiation of the terms of commitment to 278 
the content, location and timing of the action (H. H. Clark, 1996). Then, there is the main 279 
body, or the joint action proper, where the “official business” of the interaction is 280 
accomplished. Progress in accomplishing the main body needs to be coordinated, e.g., by 281 
signalling transitions from one part of a task to the next (Bangerter & Clark, 2003) or re-282 
affirming ongoing joint commitments. Because joint actions are sometimes interrupted by 283 
some external event, participants collaborate to suspend and reinstate them in an orderly way. 284 
Participants may ask permission to suspend the interaction, apologize for keeping their 285 
partners waiting, justify the necessity to suspend before reinstating the activity and check 286 
availability when attempting to re-engage (Bangerter, Chevalley, & Derouwaux, 2010; 287 
Chevalley & Bangerter, 2010). Finally, there is the closing phase where participants 288 
coordinate their readiness to end the joint action. They need to arrive at the mutual conviction 289 
that they are ready to end the interaction. In humans, participants communicate this readiness 290 
through sequences like okay - okay, ensuring that hitherto unraised topics can be addressed if 291 
necessary. Then, they progress through steps, including reminiscing about the encounter, 292 
suggesting continuity of the relationship, exchanging well-wishing expressions like good-bye 293 
and finally, taking leave of each other, for example by walking away (Albert & Kessler, 1976; 294 
Bangerter, H. Clark, & Katz, 2004; Broth & Mondada, 2013; H. Clark & French, 1981; 295 
Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). This phase can be divided into two sub-phases: the pre-exit in 296 
which participants establish mutual awareness of the readiness of participants to end the 297 
encounter, and the exit where the encounter is terminated and participants take leave of each 298 
other (Heesen et al., 2017; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). Among other things, the closing phase 299 
allows participants to symbolically maintain interpersonal relationships beyond the encounter. 300 
These phases suggest that beginnings and ending of encounters are not discrete points in time, 301 
but processes (Albert & Kessler, 1976). While they may vary cross-culturally in terms of the 302 
exact signals used to perform them, in themselves they seem to be consistent across many 303 
human cultures (Duranti, 1997; Levinson, 2006) and bear witness to the importance of 304 
constructing the psychological state of “togetherness” inherent to human joint action 305 
(Carpenter & Call, 2013). At the same time, their consistency suggests a possible ethological 306 
foundation and continuity with earlier Homo species (Levinson, 2006; Levinson & Holler, 307 
2014) or great apes. Indeed, apes also engage in coordinated actions with conspecifics, such 308 
as joint travel, cooperative hunting, social grooming or social play. As discussed above, the 309 
degree to which these actions are joint in terms of whether or not partners aim to achieve 310 
shared goals together, or whether partners have shared intentions, remains unknown. 311 
Although apes’ intentions cannot be directly measured, the communicative signals and 312 
behaviours deployed to coordinate these interactions are observable. If ape joint actions also 313 
feature observable exchanges of signals that resemble those humans use to construct opening, 314 
main body and closing phases and to deal with interruptions, then this would constitute 315 
suggestive evidence for their possession of some form of shared goals. In other words, we 316 
argue that even without necessarily creating mental representations of goals, individuals 317 
engaging in joint activities can create shared goals as a result of interactional achievements. 318 
These shared goals could be behaviourally and communicatively manifested when both 319 
partners (implicitly or explicitly) agree to engage in a joint activity together, commit to 320 
complete this activity together (even if interrupted), and seem both satisfied to end the 321 
interaction when disengaging from it. Commitment to this shared goal could also be 322 
behaviourally and communicatively evidenced  in cases of interruption of the joint activity by 323 
an external stimuli, by the use of communicative signals to advertise the necessity to suspend 324 
the activity, the reengagement of the initial social partners after interruption, the continuity of 325 
the activity at the point where it was left off at the time of suspension, or the manifestation of 326 
frustration, protest or sanction when a partner breaks the commitment without respecting the 327 
norms to disengage from it. Thus, by applying methods of investigation developed in the 328 
analysis of human joint action, it is possible to operationalize the concepts of shared goals and 329 
joint commitment (both correlates of shared intentionality) by assessing whether apes’ joint 330 
actions feature identifiable opening, main body, and closing phases, what signals are involved 331 
to coordinate the different phases and to manage cases of interruptions, whether the 332 
coordination depends on the type of activity, the species, and/or whether it is affected by the 333 
relationship between partners (friendship and rank).  334 
 Potential opening phases in ape joint action can be conceptually divided into two sub-335 
phases. First, there is the pre-entry in which one participant selects a partner, orients its body 336 
towards it, approaches it, attracts its attention, and checks its availability with the aim of 337 
attaining a state of joint attention and ascertaining they are ready and willing to participate in 338 
a yet unspecified joint action. This phase may vary in duration, depending on the initial 339 
spatial proximity between individuals. Pre-entry may be unnecessary if potential interaction 340 
partners are already in proximity to each other. Then there is the entry (see Figs. 1 and 2), 341 
where participants establish a joint commitment to engage in a specific type of joint action 342 
(with potentially species-typical initiation signals) and determine the details of its content, 343 
timing and location. For example, combinations of gesture sequences are used to signal the 344 
intention of engaging in joint travel between mother and infant chimpanzees (Fröhlich, 345 
Wittig, & Pika, 2016b), and specific gestures or body signals are used to initiate social play, 346 
social grooming (K. E. Graham, Hobaiter, Ounsley, Furuichi, & Byrne, 2018; Hobaiter & 347 
Byrne, 2014) or sex (Genty, Neumann, & Zuberbühler, 2015b) with conspecifics.  In ape 348 
interactions, the main body or the activity properly speaking (e.g., play, grooming) can be 349 
composed of sub-phases, depending on how the activity unfolds. For example, participants 350 
may coordinate a type-change e.g., from grooming to play or from contact play to chase play. 351 
They may engage in role-reversal e.g., from being the groomer to being groomed or from 352 
chasing to being chased. If an interruption occurs, for example through the intervention of a 353 
third individual, participants need to coordinate on the suspension and the possible 354 
reinstatement of the activity with their original partner. Finally, apes may express intentions 355 
to end a joint action before actually doing so (pre-exit), for instance through behaviour or 356 
communicative signals that reduce the activity intensity or tempo. In the exit, participants 357 
may take leave of each other via communicative signals or specific behaviours beyond simply 358 
walking away. Like the pre-entry, the exit may be dropped if partners remain in proximity to 359 
each other. 360 
4. Joint action coordination in great apes 361 
4.1 Candidate activities for the study of joint action in great apes 362 
Social play and social grooming represent two promising candidate activities for the study of 363 
joint action coordination in apes. They are both frequent, require on-the-fly coordination 364 
between partners for prolonged periods of time and involve reciprocity and communication to 365 
distinguish them from related, non-friendly contexts (Demuru, Ferrari, & Palagi, 2015; 366 
Fedurek et al., 2015; Fröhlich, Wittig, & Pika, 2016c; Genty et al., 2009; Hobaiter & Byrne, 367 
2011; Elisabetta Palagi, 2006). Social play covers many functions (K. L. Graham & 368 
Burghardt, 2010; Göncü, & Gaskins, 2007), including learning social positions and rules 369 
(Poirier & Smith, 1974; Tartabini & Dienske, 1979), reducing aggression and establishing 370 
social bonds (Drea, Hawk, & Glickman, 1996; Pellis & Pellis, 1996). Although all partner 371 
combinations are possible, apes seem to prefer to engage in play with individuals matching in 372 
age class (Cordoni & Palagi, 2011).  373 
Social grooming, beyond its hygienic function, serves to reduce tension (C. 374 
Crockford et al., 2013), promote tolerance (Port, Clough, & Kappeler, 2009), restore 375 
relationships after aggression (Aureli, Cords, & Van Schaik, 2002; Barrett, Gaynor, & Henzi, 376 
2002), facilitate coalitions, and establish and maintain social bonds (Dunbar, 1991, 2010; 377 
Fedurek & Dunbar, 2009; Schino, di Sorrentino, & Tiddi, 2007; Seyfarth & Cheney, 1984). 378 
Male chimpanzees close in rank groom each other more than those distant in rank (Arnold & 379 
Whiten, 2003) and lower ranking males spend more time grooming higher ranking males 380 
(Kaburu & Newton-Fisher, 2016; Schino & Aureli, 2009). Male bonobos with strong social 381 
bonds groom each other more often, but the duration and reciprocity of consecutive grooming 382 
bouts is not influenced by rank difference (Surbeck & Hohmann, 2015). 383 
Another promising candidate activity for the study of joint action coordination in 384 
great apes is sex. In particular, bonobos are known for their socio-sexual behaviour (de Waal, 385 
1987; Kano, 1992; Kuroda, 1984), and exhibit frequent sexual interactions, in almost every 386 
partner combination. Beyond reproduction, bonobos’ sexual behaviour functions to mediate 387 
their social interactions and relationships, including tension reduction (Hohmann et al., 2009), 388 
especially in the context of food competition, where it is offered to gain access to resources 389 
(de Waal, 1987; Kano, 1992; Kuroda, 1984; Parish, 1994). Sex is also used for strengthening 390 
female social bonds (Badrian &Badrian, 1984; Furuichi, 1989; Hohmann & Fruth, 2000; 391 
Kano, 1992), for consolation (Clay & de Waal, 2013), and reconciliation (Clay & de Waal, 392 
2014: de Waal, 1990; Hohmann & Fruth, 2000). However, bonobos’ sexual interactions are 393 
rarely isolated from other social interactions, mainly play, grooming, and feeding, and for this 394 
reason it appears difficult to detach this specific activity from its role in the coordination of 395 
the larger activity itself (e.g., sex is often used right at the end of a social activity to ensure a 396 
smooth ending to the interaction).  397 
 Communicating about intentions and subsequent behaviours is essential to initiate, 398 
maintain, and terminate joint actions in animals, especially for activities involving close 399 
physical proximity, such as play and grooming, that are risky and could potentially give way 400 
to aggression. Consequently, many species exhibit specific signals and behaviours to 401 
advertise friendly intentions (Bekoff & Allen, 1998; Fedurek et al., 2015; Elisabetta Palagi, 402 
Cordoni, & Borgognini Tarli, 2004) and to coordinate this type of joint action. Great apes 403 
look at their partner and engage in mutual gaze as a way of establishing participation 404 
frameworks (Liebal et al., 2004; Rossano & Liebal, 2014; Rossano, 2013). They use specific 405 
gestural communication to initiate play bouts (Genty et al., 2009), reengage reluctant partners 406 
(Hobaiter & Byrne, 2014), change tempo (Hobaiter & Byrne, 2014) and terminate play bouts 407 
(Fröhlich et al., 2017; Genty et al., 2009; Heesen et al., 2017; Hobaiter & Byrne, 2014). Play 408 
bouts are also maintained with the use of play faces and laughter (Enomoto, 1990; E. Palagi, 409 
2008).  410 
 Great apes initiate social grooming with specific postural, gestural or vocal signals 411 
(Fedurek & Dunbar, 2009; Goodall, 1986; Hobaiter & Byrne, 2014) and direct the groomer’s 412 
attention to a desired body location with specific signals (K. E. Graham et al., 2018; Hobaiter 413 
& Byrne, 2014; Pika & Mitani, 2006). Grooming is often reciprocated by taking turns in 414 
coordinated ways (Machanda, Gilby, & Wrangham, 2014). Risks of aggression are prevented 415 
(for instance when grooming vulnerable body parts like the face or genital area) and bouts 416 
maintained by lip-smacking (Fedurek et al., 2015). To date, play and grooming interactions 417 
have been investigated in a rather fragmented manner focusing mainly on the initiation, 418 
maintenance or more rarely on the termination of the activities. Researchers, however, have 419 
rarely focused on the sequential organization of the activities and how the communicative 420 
signals potentially represent means to solve the coordination problems inherent with 421 
initiating, maintaining and closing joint action (Hayaki, 1985; Heesen et al., 2017; King, 422 
2009). 423 
In what follows we will present a fine-grained analysis of seven examples of joint 424 
action coordination in bonobo dyads engaged in grooming and play.  425 
4.2 Examples of joint action coordination in bonobos 426 
Images were taken from video clips of interactions collected as part of a larger project on joint 427 
action coordination in bonobos and chimpanzees. We recorded focal samples from 9 428 
individuals at the San Diego Zoo, USA between January and March 2017 (270 hours of 429 
recording) and from 16 individuals at La Vallée des Singes, France between April and 430 
September 2017 (330 hours of recording). Grooming and play interactions were recorded on a 431 
digital camera equipped with a directional microphone in order to capture all visual and audible 432 
signals deployed. In the following excerpts, we briefly describe the relationship between the 433 
two protagonists in terms of kinship, social bonds and dominance rank. To assess the strength 434 
of social bonds and the dominance relationships we used measures of Dyadic Sociality Index 435 
(Neumann, in preparation) and Elo-rating (Neumann & Kulik, 2014) respectively.  More 436 
precisely, for the Dyadic Sociality Index, to determine the strength of social bonds between 437 
partners, we analysed, for each dyad, the duration and direction (i.e., who initiated the 438 
interaction) of grooming and play interactions, the number and direction of approaches, and the 439 
time they spent in close proximity to one another (i.e., arm-length distance). For the elo-rating, 440 
the dominance rank of each individual was calculated based on the outcome of conflicts (i.e., 441 
winner, loser or tie). The values varied between 0.04 (weakest bond) and 5.48 (strongest bond) 442 
for La Vallée des Singes, and between 0.21 (weakest bond) and 3.87 (strongest bond) for the 443 
San Diego zoo. For the following descriptive illustrations, we used the median (0.61 for La 444 
Vallée des Singes, and 0.68 for the San Diego zoo) as a cut-off value to categorize the strength 445 
of social bonds, i.e., the pairs with a value above the median were considered as strongly 446 
bonded, and those with values below the median as weakly bonded. The elo-rating scores varied 447 
between 417 (lowest ranking) and 1663 (highest ranking) for La Vallée des Singes, and between 448 
761 (lowest ranking) and 1258 (highest ranking) for the San Diego zoo. The evaluation of 449 
relative difference in rank between partners was based on their individual elo-rating scores. 450 
 The following examples illustrate how the joint actions are initiated (Examples 1 and 451 
2), how they are interrupted and resumed (Examples 3,4 and 5) and how they are ended 452 
(Examples 6 and 7). These examples were selected based on their image quality, their ability 453 
to best illustrate each of the different subphases of joint action, the fact that they included 454 
clear and visible signals, and because they featured various combinations of partners’ 455 
relationship types. We highlight similarities and differences in the behavioural structure of the 456 
initiation, maintenance, resumption and closing of bonobo joint actions and those of humans. 457 
The communicative signals indicated in italics are part of the species’ described repertoire of 458 
gestures (Genty, Clay, Hobaiter, & Zuberbühler, 2014; Genty et al., 2015b; K. E. Graham, 459 
Furuichi, & Byrne, 2017), facial expressions (de Waal, 1988), vocalisations and body 460 
postures (Bermejo & Omedes, 1999; de Waal, 1988; Genty et al., 2014). 461 
4.2.1. Example 1: Opening of grooming interaction between two adult males 462 
Example 1 (Fig. 1) is extracted from Clip S1 and illustrates the opening of a grooming 463 
interaction between two adult males, Kelele and Diwani, housed at La Vallée des Singes, 464 
France. They are both low-ranking, with Diwani being higher in rank (elo-rating= 953) than 465 
Kelele (elo-rating= 417). They are unrelated and share a strong bond (DSI=1.31). Right 466 
before the beginning of the interaction, Kelele and Diwani are sitting in the grass about 4 467 
metres apart, their backs turned to one another.  468 
4.2.1.1. Pre-entry  469 
Kelele stands up and approaches Diwani from his right side (Fig.1, I-1.). They gaze at each 470 
other, for 1.0 s, establishing mutual gaze and a potential participation framework (Fig. 1, I-2). 471 
4.2.1.2. Entry  472 
 Diwani and Kelele gaze at each other twice, (for 0.50 and 1.10 s) before Diwani reaches out 473 
(Reach) with his right foot (Fig. 1, I-3), waits for a response, persists and repeats Reach 474 
gesture and extends it further, waits for a response, and repeats Reach gesture again. Kelele 475 
sits down in front of Diwani and presents (Present) his body for grooming (Fig. 1, I-4). 476 
Diwani approaches and sits close to Kelele. Kelele approaches his face to peer into Diwani’s 477 
eyes (Fig. 1, I-5), Diwani starts grooming Kelele’s head (Fig. 1, I-6). 478 
We suggest that the communicative signals used by Kelele and Diwani in the opening phase 479 
(Reach, Present), associated with the exchange of gazes between participants are used to 480 
establish the type of activity they are going to be engaging in (i.e., grooming), their individual 481 
roles (groomer/ groomee) and a potential participation framework. They solve several 482 
coordination problems, for example clarifying Kelele’s intentions and verifying both partners’ 483 
availability and willingness to engage in a grooming bout. 484 
 485 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 486 
 487 
4.2.2. Example 2: Opening of play interaction between an adult male and an infant male 488 
This example is extracted from Clip S2 and illustrates the opening of a play interaction 489 
between an adult male, David, and his infant male son, Moko, housed at La Vallée des 490 
Singes, France. Their mothers are the two highest ranking females in the group, indirectly 491 
conferring them a high status in the group. David is the highest-ranking male in the group 492 
(elo-rating=1428), Moko is also high ranking (elo-rating= 1099). Their bond is quite strong 493 
(DSI= 1.22). 494 
4.2.2.1. Entry 495 
 Moko is sitting on a tree trunk, holding a rope (Fig 2, I-1). David approaches him. They gaze 496 
at each other for 5.8 s, establishing mutual gaze and a potential participation framework (Fig. 497 
2, I-2.). Moko stomps his left foot on the rope (Stomp) (Fig. 2, I-3.). David climbs on the tree 498 
trunk and Moko stands up to move aside (Fig.2, I-4) while they gaze at each other again for 499 
0.62 s, then again for 1.76 s.  Moko performs a somersault (Somersault) on the tree trunk 500 
(Fig. 2, I-5) and David approaches Moko to initiate contact play (Fig. 2, I-6) by mock-biting 501 
him.  502 
We suggest that the gestural signals used by Moko in the opening phase (Stomp, Somersault), 503 
associated with the exchange of gazes between participants are used to establish the type of 504 
activity they are going to be engaging in and a potential participation framework. 505 
 506 
--- Figure 2 about here --- 507 
 508 
4.2.3. Example 3:  Interruption and resumption of grooming (in main body) between an adult 509 
female and an adult male 510 
This example is extracted from Clip S3 and illustrates the re-engagement of a partner 511 
following an interruption of a grooming interaction between an adult female, Lisa, and an 512 
adult male, Vic, housed in the San Diego zoo, USA. Vic is Lisa’s son and they share a 513 
relatively strong bond (DSI= 0.96). Lisa is the second highest ranking female (elo-rating= 514 
1197) in the group and Vic is of medium rank (elo-rating= 985).  515 
4.2.3.1. Interruption 516 
Lisa and Vic have been engaged in grooming for almost 3 minutes. At this point, Lisa is 517 
grooming Vic’s right shoulder (Fig. 3, I-1). Their attention is distracted by an external event 518 
(noise in the upper part of the enclosure). They look in the direction of the interruption source 519 
and interrupt their grooming bout (Fig. 3, I-2). They both stand up and walk in the direction 520 
of the noise (Fig. 4, I-3). Vic climbs up a tree to get closer to it (Fig. 3, I-4). They both gaze 521 
up in the direction of the noise (Fig. 3, I-4). Lisa walks back to the location where they were 522 
grooming before, Vic remains in the tree. Vic later gazes at Lisa, climbs down the tree (Fig. 3, 523 
I-5) and walks back towards Lisa, Lisa watches him approaching (Fig. 4, I-6). They gaze at 524 
each other (Fig. 3, I-7). After an interruption of 1 min 10 s in total, Lisa reengages him in the 525 
grooming interaction. She claps her hand (Clap) at Vic’s approach (Fig. 3, I-7) and reaches 526 
out to him with her right hand (Reach) (Fig. 3, I-8). Vic sits down in body contact with Lisa. 527 
Lisa starts grooming him again on the left shoulder at the same location they were sitting 528 
before the interruption (Fig. 3, I-9). 529 
The resumption of the activity with the same partner and at the same location, after being 530 
interrupted by an external event, having relocated and being physically separated, and the 531 
reengagement via communicative signals, suggests the possibility that Lisa and Vic are both 532 
committed to grooming each other at a specific location until both are ready to terminate the 533 
activity. We also suggest that the communicative signals used to reengage the partner, i.e., the 534 
gestures Clap and Reach, associated with direct gaze, represent potential reengagement 535 
signals. 536 
 537 
--- Figure 3 about here --- 538 
 539 
4.2.4.  Example 4: Interruption and resumption of grooming (in main body) between an adult 540 
female and an adult male 541 
This example is extracted from Clip S4 and illustrates the reengagement of a partner 542 
following an interruption in the main body of a grooming interaction between a high-ranking 543 
(elo-rating = 1255) adult female, Ulindi, and an unrelated low-ranking (elo-rating=417) adult 544 
male, Kelele, housed at La Vallée des Singes, France. They have a relatively strong bond 545 
(DSI= 0.95).  546 
4.2.4.1. Interruption 547 
Kelele and Ulindi have been grooming for about 38 minutes. During this interaction several 548 
role-reversals (from groomer to groomee) and minor interruptions occurred. Ulindi is 549 
grooming Kelele’s left leg at this point (Fig. 4, I-1). She takes a break, interrupting the 550 
grooming bout. After 5 sec, their attention is directed towards David, the highest-ranking 551 
male of the group, approaching (Fig. 4, I-2). When David arrives in close proximity to them, 552 
he looks at Kelele (Fig. 4, I-3). Kelele moves aside with a pout face (Pout) (Fig. 4, I-3). David 553 
sits between them and starts grooming Ulindi’s right foot (Fig. 4, I-4). Ulindi immediately 554 
bends over, stretches out her arms to grab Kelele’s shoulder and arm (Grab) and pulls Kelele 555 
to her (Pull) to reengage him in the previously interrupted grooming interaction (Fig. 4, I-5) 556 
Ulindi resumes grooming on Kelele’s right arm (Fig. 4, I-6). David sits up and stops 557 
grooming Ulindi.   558 
Even when interrupted by a high-ranking individual, Ulindi resumes the interrupted grooming 559 
interaction with Kelele, her original partner. This suggests the possibility that the two partners 560 
are committed to grooming each other until both are ready to terminate the activity.  561 
 562 
--- Figure 4 about here --- 563 
 564 
4.2.5. Example 5: Interruption and resumption of grooming (in main body) between an adult 565 
female and an adult male 566 
This example is extracted from Clip S5 and illustrates the reengagement of partners following 567 
an interruption in the main body of a grooming interaction between an adult female, Ulindi, 568 
and an unrelated adult male, Diwani, housed at La Vallée des Singes, France. They have a 569 
weak bond (DSI= 0.6). Ulindi is high-ranking (elo-rating= 1255) and Diwani is of medium 570 
rank (elo-rating= 953).  571 
4.2.5.1. Interruption 572 
Ulindi and Diwani have been engaged in a grooming interaction for about 6 minutes, with no 573 
role reversals but one previous interruption (at 1min into grooming and 20s long) caused by a 574 
third party and followed by reengagement. At this point, Diwani is grooming Ulindi’s neck 575 
(Fig. 5, I-1). A noise in the holding area attracts Diwani’s attention (Fig. 5, I-2). He looks up, 576 
stands up and walks in the direction of the noise. Ulindi stands up and follows him (Fig. 5, I-577 
3). They both walk towards the holding area and peer inside to find the source of distraction. 578 
After a few seconds, Diwani turns around and walks away (Fig. 5, I-4). Ulindi stays a little 579 
longer and peers inside the holding area again (Fig. 5, I-5). Diwani and Ulindi are about 4 580 
metres apart, they gaze at each other for 1.5 s (Fig. 5, I-6). Diwani starts walking back 581 
towards the location where they were grooming before the interruption. Ulindi starts walking 582 
in the same direction. After 1 minute of interruption in total, Diwani sits down at the same 583 
location in their enclosure they were grooming before the interruption. Ulindi approaches 584 
him. When mutual gaze has been re-established, Diwani reengages the interrupted grooming 585 
interaction by presenting for grooming (Present) (Fig. 5, I-7). Ulindi comes in close 586 
proximity and presents her backside for grooming (Present), all the while they gaze at each 587 
other (for 3.15 s) (Fig. 5, I-8). Diwani starts grooming her backside (Fig. 5, I-9). The 588 
grooming interaction is reinstated.  589 
 590 
The resumption of the activity, with the same partner and at the same location, after being 591 
interrupted by an external event, having relocated and being physically separated, and the 592 
reengagement of partner via communicative signals, suggests the possibility that Ulindi and 593 
Diwani are committed to grooming each other, at a specific location, until both are ready to 594 
terminate the activity. We further suggest that the gaze exchanges and Present body postures 595 
deployed during the reinstatement of the activity, potentially represent reengagement signals. 596 
 597 
--- Figure 5 about here --- 598 
 599 
4.2.6. Example 6:  Closing of a play interaction between an adult male and an infant male 600 
This example is extracted from Clip S2 (see 4.2. for description of social partners in terms of 601 
identity, kinship, social bonds and dominance relationship). 602 
 603 
4.2.6.1. Exit 604 
David and Moko have been playing for about a minute (40 s in contact play then changed 605 
play type (Type change) from contact to chase play) and engaged in a chase play for 15 sec 606 
when David stops running and sits down (Fig. 6, I-1). Moko slaps David’s back (Slap) (Fig. 6, 607 
I-1) with a play face (Playface), David replies with a play face (Playface) (Fig. 6, I-1). David 608 
puts his hand on Moko’s back (Hand on) (Fig. 6, I-2). Moko climbs up the tree trunk, David 609 
gazes at Moko (Fig. 6, I-3). Moko lays down on top of the tree trunk. The play interaction is 610 
closed. We suggest that the gestural signal (Hand on) and the gaze deployed during the 611 
Closing phase might potentially represent leave-taking signals. 612 
 613 
--- Figure 6 about here --- 614 
 615 
 4.2.7. Example 7: Closing of a grooming interaction between two adult females 616 
This example is extracted from Clip S6 and illustrates the closing phase of a grooming 617 
interaction between two adult females, Daniela and Ulindi, housed at La Vallée des Singes, 618 
France. Daniela and Ulindi are both high-ranking. Daniela is higher ranking (elo-rating= 619 
1482) than Ulindi (elo-rating= 1255). They have a relatively strong bond (DSI= 0.72).  620 
4.2.7.1. Exit 621 
 Daniela and Ulindi have been grooming for almost 30 min (Fig. 7, I-1) with two role-622 
reversals (from groomer to groomee) and one interruption. At this time, Daniela is grooming 623 
Ulindi’s left arm (Fig. 7, I-1). Daniela stops grooming Ulindi (Fig. 7, I-2), grabs Ulindi’s left 624 
arm with her left hand (Grab) (Fig. 7, I-3)  stands up, grabs Ulindi’s left arm with her right 625 
hand (Grab) and starts walking away (Fig. 7, I-4). Ulindi looks at Kallie walking away (Fig. 626 
7, I-4). While walking away Daniela gazes back twice at Ulindi who is gazing back at her 627 
(Fig. 7, I-5, I-6). Ulindi looks at Daniela walking away. The grooming interaction is closed. 628 
 629 
We suggest that the gestural signals (Grab) might represent leave-taking signals and mutual 630 
gazes with gazing back at a partner while walking away during a closing phase might be used 631 
to ensure that the mutual conviction to terminate the activity has been reached. 632 
 633 
--- Figure 7 about here --- 634 
 635 
5. Discussion 636 
The question of whether cooperative actions of nonhuman species like great apes involve 637 
shared intentionality is still open and results are controversial. While empirical research 638 
suggesting that they do not (Warneken et al. 2006) is limited by confounds (Leavens et al., 639 
2017), there are conceptual problems with defining shared intentionality as a high-level 640 
cognitive ability (Kern & Moll, 2017; Rosas & Bermúdez, 2018; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2016; 641 
Townsend et al., 2017). Agents who do not possess such abilities are nonetheless able to 642 
engage in complex forms of cooperation. Alignment processes at ‘lower’ levels like 643 
perceptual or motor behaviour may potentially serve to coordinate joint actions (Tollefsen & 644 
Dale, 2012). In this paper, we proposed that such processes are empirically accessible in the 645 
form of behavioural outputs and exchanges of signals, sometimes in turn-taking sequences, to 646 
enable coordinated action. Shared intentionality, in other words, may be the outcome of 647 
empirically accessible coordination work by participants, an ‘interactional achievement’ 648 
(Mondada, 2011; Schegloff, 1986). Rather than focussing on the putative cognitive states that 649 
may or may not underlie cooperative action (and potentially confer upon those instances the 650 
status of bona fide joint action as found in adult humans), comparing the steps by which 651 
participants in joint actions get into, maintain and get out of them in an orderly manner may 652 
constitute a framework to systematically assess the presence of shared intentionality across 653 
species. 654 
 655 
Building on research from the study of human interaction, we described a set of generic 656 
coordination problems that would-be participants must solve to achieve coordinated action 657 
and illustrated their application to examples of joint actions in bonobos. Bonobos’ joint 658 
activities evidence some features of macro-level phases of opening, main body and closing. 659 
Some of the described behaviours could potentially correspond to correlates of a sense of 660 
commitment: reengaging partners after interruptions, reversing roles and taking leave of 661 
partners. They use signals like gestures, vocalizations, body postures and gaze exchanges to 662 
coordinate the different phases of joint action and navigate between them. From the examples 663 
described, mutual gaze exchanges seem to be consistently used during openings to check 664 
partners’ availability and ratify participants, thus potentially establishing a participation 665 
framework, gestures (such as Reach in grooming and Stomp in play) and body posture (such 666 
as Present in grooming) are used to initiate the activity, to potentially ratify participants and 667 
establish the type of activity to be engaged in (i.e., grooming or play in these cases). During 668 
the main body, signals are used to maintain the activity and potentially the joint commitment 669 
to engage in the current activity together, such as Playfaces and Slap in play. Following 670 
interruptions, signals are used to reengage the initial partner and reinstate the activity. These 671 
signals resemble initiation signals, such as Reach, Grab or Clap in grooming. Finally, some 672 
signals are deployed during closings, such as Hand on in play, Grab in grooming, mutual 673 
gazes and gazing back at their partner (in grooming and play) while disengaging from the 674 
activity. No vocal signals were described in the excerpts, but for instance laughter is 675 
commonly used during play bouts to maintain the play activity (Heesen et al., 2017) and lip-676 
smacking to maintain grooming bouts (Fedurek et al., 2015). Although we are reporting 677 
observations on just a handful of examples extracted from a large data set, engagement in 678 
these types of activities and therefore joint actions is rather common in great apes. Here, the 679 
goal has been to illustrate the alignment processes that facilitate the achievement of joint 680 
action. This framework expands the observable correlates of shared intentionality, by 681 
redefining it as a transient, collective state of being, achieved in interaction. This framework 682 
can facilitate systematic comparison between human and great apes (or other primate species) 683 
(Jaeggi, Burkart, & Van Schaik, 2010), revealing insights into their capacities to co-construct 684 
a state of shared intentionality through the orderly process of joint action coordination. Such 685 
insights may help reconstruct the evolution of human-like shared intentionality and cognition-686 
for-interaction underpinning human joint action.  687 
 688 
With this research framework we propose to address the following research questions: How 689 
do the phases relate to the overall activity? Do the signals deployed convey specific 690 
information regarding the status of the activity (e.g., are mutual gaze exchanges during 691 
closings used as leave-taking signals to ensure that the mutual conviction to terminate the 692 
activity has been reached)? How is the presence and duration of phases and the type of signals 693 
used to navigate across the phases affected by the type of activity, the species’ social 694 
organization and the relationship (friendship, rank) between partners? Can we find possible 695 
evidence that apes understand shared goals? For example by showing potential behavioural 696 
correlates of an awareness of joint commitment such as, in the case of interruption of the joint 697 
activity by an external stimulus, the use of communicative signals to advertise the necessity to 698 
suspend the activity, the reengagement of the initial social partners after interruption, the 699 
continuity of the activity at the point where it was left off at the time of suspension, or the 700 
manifestation of frustration, protest or sanction when a partner breaks the commitment 701 
without respecting the norms to disengage from it? 702 
This approach also allows us to highlight similarities and difference across species in the 703 
ability to create shared intentionality and shed some light on the evolution of this supposedly 704 
human ‘unique’ ability. We further speculate that if language has evolved as a means to solve 705 
coordination problems (De Ruiter & Levinson, 2008; Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, 2008) by 706 
communicating cooperatively about goals and intentions, we might learn more about its 707 
origins by looking at the way our closest relatives coordinate joint activities. Our approach 708 
would thus allow us to explore one aspect of the evolution of language that is the 709 
development of cooperative communication as a means to coordinate joint action to achieve 710 
shared intentionality. Accordingly, while Tomasello (2014) traces back the emergence of 711 
shared intentionality to Homo heidelbergensis (400,000 ya), this framework and initial 712 
observations might suggest otherwise. Indeed, if we find similarity in the way bonobos and 713 
chimpanzees coordinate joint action, and if we find evidence for the presence of components 714 
of shared intentionality, such as the understanding of joint commitment to a shared goal, we 715 
could trace back at least some of the building blocks of shared intentionality and language to 716 
our common ancestor (Levinson & Holler, 2014), and refute the claim that shared 717 
intentionality emerged only with the genus Homo.  718 
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Figure 1. Opening of grooming interaction between two adult males, Kelele (K) and Diwani (D) at La Vallée des Singes, France. Red arrows indicate gaze direction, red



















Figure 1 Click here to access/download;Figure;MS IS-18048-Figure 1.eps
Figure 2. Opening of play interaction between an adult male David (D) and an infant male Moko (M) at La Vallée des Singes, France. Red arrows indicate gaze direction, red
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Figure 3. Interruption and resumption of grooming (in main body) between an adult female Lisa (L) and  her adult son Vic (V) at the San Diego zoo, USA.
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Figure 4. Interruption and resumption of grooming (in main body) between an adult female Ulindi (U) and an adult male Kelele (K) at La Vallée des Singes, 










































Figure 4 Click here to access/download;Figure;MS IS-18048-Figure 4.eps
Figure 5. Interruption and resumption of grooming (in main body) between an adult female Ulindi (U) and an  adult male Diwani (Di) at La Vallée des Singes, France.
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Figure 6. Closing of play interaction between an adult male David (D) and an infant male Moko (M) at La Vallée des Singes, France.
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Figure 7. Closing of grooming interaction between two adult females Daniela (Da) and Ulindi (U) at La Vallée des Singes, France. Red
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